

Could Executive Outcomes have ended the 1994 Rwandan Genocide?

Note and introduction: I have often been asked whether Executive Outcomes could have ended the Rwandan genocide in 1994 which killed between 500,000 to 800,000 people. I recently put this question to Chris Grové, formerly the Chief of Staff of EO, and he and others subsequently figured out the details and of such a mission. Short answer: yes.

The following document goes into detail about a plan of action and costs of such a mission. Chris Grové emphasized to me that this was written with the advantage of hindsight, but it does indicate how a private company could quickly intervene to end such a humanitarian catastrophe in the future. Essentially EO could have had armed troops on the ground in 14 days and could have been fully deployed with just over 1500 personnel on the ground within six weeks providing safe havens and confronting the militias. Estimated cost for EO's six-month operation: \$150m. Compare that to the estimated cost of the dysfunctional UN peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone of almost \$100m a month.

Chris Grové wanted me to emphasize that he is a *former* EO employee, and that he now runs his own unrelated company, NFD (Pty) Ltd., which does specialized security services in South Africa and abroad. Information on his current company can be seen at www.nfdsecurity.co.za

If you have questions about this document, please feel free to contact Chris Grové directly at +27 12 666 7055, Fax: +27 12 666 7272, email nfdsecon@iti.co.za

Regards,

Doug

Doug Brooks
Bradlow Fellow

South African Institute of International Affairs
PO Box 31596
Braamfontein 2017
South Africa

Cell: 083-961-5791
Ph : (27-11) 339-2021
Fax: (27-11) 339-2154
Home: (27-11) 447-7080
Email: Hoosier84@aol.com
Home Page: <http://www.geocities.com/hoosier84/dougtitle.html>

A POSSIBLE ROLE OF EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES (A PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANY, NOW DISBANDED), DURING THE RWANDA GENOCIDE OF 1993/1994

Dear Doug,

During the Rwanda genocide we believe Executive Outcomes (EO) could have stopped the massacres if given the opportunity to intervene on behalf of the UN. We had many discussions about the situation since late 1993 through to the middle of 1994. The then CEO of EO made comments to journalists during that time of how we viewed the situation and how EO could possibly go about resolving the conflict if approached by the UN.

However, before I provide you with our view as a possible answer to the Rwandan crises then, we need to briefly look at what the problem was at the time.

Conflict between the Hutu dominated Rwanda Armed Forces and the Tutsi inspired Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), first broke out in October 1990. Only 3 years later, on 4 August 1993, a cease-fire agreement was signed between the belligerent parties that allowed for the deployment of a UN Peacekeeping Force to the region.

The United Nations Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was approved by the UN Security Council on 4 September 1993, to implement a four-phased plan over a period of 16 months to keep the peace in Rwanda. The main aim of UNAMIR in Rwanda was to:

- ❑ de-mobilise and integrate various armed forces and gendarmerie, and to
- ❑ monitor democratic elections and the installation of a new government, which was to be formed.

Under UN Security Resolution 872, the 1st UNAMIR Battalion completed deployment in the capital Kigali in mid December 1993, more than two months after the mandate for deployment was issued.

Since the deployment of the UNAMIR troops in Rwanda the security situation deteriorated steadily and reached a peak, when an aircraft carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and President Ntaryamira of Burundi crashed (or was shot down), killing all those on board.

This incident sparked a civil war, which led to a countrywide massacre of Hutu opposition and intelligentsia, as well as members of the Tutsi minority and RPF supporters.

Within 2 weeks, tens of thousands people had been killed. Victims of the violence included 10 x Belgium soldiers serving in UNAMIR. The Belgian government subsequently withdrew the battalion that was stationed in Kigali.

At the end of April 1994, it became patently obvious that the weakened UNAMIR had neither the mandate nor the strength to take effective action to halt the massacres and genocide.

In May 1994 UNAMIR was reduced to only 444 personnel in Rwanda consisting essentially out of one battalion from Ghana. Shortly thereafter the UN Security Council approved the deployment of 5,500 UNAMIR II troops to support and provide safe conditions for displaced persons, as well as humanitarian assistance in Rwanda.

Two weeks before the French withdrawal on 19 July 1994, a broad-based government of natural unity was formed in Rwanda.

On 1 August 1994, fewer than 500 UNAMIR II troops (of the promised 5,500 personnel) were deployed in Rwanda while the RPF had established military control over most the country. About 1,5 million Hutu's (mainly) refugees sought shelter and refuge in the DRC out of fear of retribution. Out of a total Rwandan population of ± 7 million people, as many as half a million had been killed, 3 million internally displaced and 2 million fled the country to neighbouring countries.

The international community's delayed reaction to respond with prompt and decisive action, led to a humanitarian crisis entwined with armed conflict. This in our view, was due to the:

- ❑ lack of international political will to resolve the crises;
- ❑ lack of a clear concept of operations by UNAMIR I & II for keeping/enforcing the peace;
- ❑ inability of UNAMIR to maintain impartiality in the conflict ;
- ❑ lack of UN finances to support the operation;
- ❑ ill defined rules of engagement;
- ❑ UN who lacked the capacity to implement rapid and effective decisions of the Security Council to intervene in the humanitarian crises; and
- ❑ UNAMIR were least available and least effective in providing security and as such proved an unwieldy humanitarian instrument due to their pre-occupation with force protection.

So, to come back to your question whether EO could have stopped the massacres? ... and if so, how many troops could EO have assembled for such an action? ... the costs involved and a possible time frame?

It is important to note that at the peak of the Rwandan Crises, EO had already been heavily involved in providing foreign military assistance to the Angolan Government (MPLA). It is also important to note that EO would only get involved in resolving the Sierra Leone Crises from February 1995 onwards. The reason why this fact should be borne in mind, is merely that at the time, EO had the capacity and the resources (or had access to sufficient manpower, equipment and logistics on a short notice), to simultaneously serve another contract similar in size of the Angolan contract.

Executive Outcomes, a Private Military Company (PMC) could at the time, if approached by the UN or the OAU, supply personnel, equipment and heavy transport planes (which is regarded as key success factors of African peace operations) to rapidly deploy a reaction force to the Rwandan region, to deal with the crises as it developed (similarly to EO's assistance of the SLAF in Sierra Leone to counter the RUF about one year later).

What was EO's approach to the Rwandan problem?

The Rwandan crisis was just one of many case studies that EO's planning staff from time to time executed. EO's approach towards the Rwandan crises was that, if given an international mandate, it would assist the Government of Rwanda to protect its fundamental right to defend itself against internal destabilisation and anarchy. Our primary role of assistance would be to act according to the rules of engagement with force and conviction, after having analysed the threat, the terrain and all role players involved in the conflict.

EO's plan of action (concept of operations) for any type of foreign military assistance was always formulated in accordance with the demands of the Client and its environment. Client unique traditions and culture determined the unique methods that EO used to achieve specific objectives. EO thus would have acted with weapons that complied to certain specifications and with manpower at its disposal at the time, to achieve specific objectives according to a given mandate.

A Typical Concept of Operations for the Rwandan crises would generally have comprised of conventional-, counter insurgency and unconventional actions integrated and applied pro-actively in sinchro in Rwanda to counter the existing threat. The multidimensional threat that existed required simultaneous and combined actions. This means that EO's operational philosophy would have been to maintain a credible mobile force that could be deployed as a strong regional force. The mobile force should further be able to support counter insurgency deployments and support or execute tactical operations in the Rwandan area of influence.

EO's concept of operations further, would have carried a dynamic accent of manoeuvring and the application of an indirect approach, while the acquisition and maintenance of initiative and freedom of action would enjoy a high priority. The primary role of EO in Rwanda would therefor have been to cost effectively:

- ❑ established (create) security islands (spring boards) in the region from where peace enforcement actions are launched against dissidents (the "oil spill-effect"); this would also serve as safe havens for housing refugees and displaced persons, as well as for disaster aid relief operations.
- ❑ prevent and suppress terrorism
- ❑ prevent and suppress military and civil anarchy and unrest
- ❑ conserve and protect life, health and property, and/or the maintenance of essential services
- ❑ execute as the need arose certain prescribed police duties
- ❑ co-operation with all friendly parties

EO's rapid deployment force (RDF) composition (which had already proved itself at the time in Angola), would have been able to provide assistance in Rwanda within the concept of conventional warfare, mobile- and static operations with the emphasis on pro-active offensive defense. Possible tasks of the RDF in Rwanda could have been:

- pro-active actions to prevent dissident/enemy force building, bmo pre-emptive operations
- reinforcement of Rwandan Government conventional/counter insurgency deployed forces
- reaction against internal unrest or infiltration of terror groups/dissidents
- show of force, internally
- “fire brigade” actions against “flash points” during counter insurgency operations
- “blitzkrieg” offensive actions, that focuses on quick victories executed by a concentrated and integrated force complement. This style would emphasise:
 - ❖ quick, mobile and surprise offensive actions
 - ❖ warfare in rear areas
 - ❖ bind the enemy/dissidents, distribute its forces and dislocate it over the wide Rwandan front
 - ❖ initiative and freedom of action
 - ❖ application of the indirect approach
 - ❖ maintenance of momentum
 - ❖ create fluidity in operations
 - ❖ clinical application of manoeuvring
 - ❖ conquering of sensitive or key objectives
 - ❖ effective command and control and decentralised execution

The actual EO force composition to counter the Rwandan crises would obviously have depended on the nature of the task (threat and terrain). A quick appreciation of the situation followed by a tactical military operational planning cycle (± 3 days) whilst simultaneously deploying reconnaissance elements to gather and confirm real time intelligence, would be the first step in the deployment drills. The formulated operational plan (various selected courses of action) would determine how the force complements and subsequent logistical support organisations would have to be structured.

In 1994, EO's planning staff appreciated that a well equipped, light composite air mobile brigade, supported by a guaranteed and flexible decentralised logistical system, would be needed to successfully stop the massacres in Rwanda. EO's Rapid Deployment Force specifically composed to deal with the Rwandan crises, consisting of 1,527 personnel, could have been structured as follows:

□ RDF Head Quarters and Support Staff	36 personnel
□ Air Wing	55 personnel
□ 1 st RDF (Peace Enforcement) Battalion	375 personnel
□ 2 nd RDF (Peace Enforcement) Battalion	375 personnel
□ 3 rd RDF (Peace Enforcement) Battalion	375 personnel
□ Support (Disaster Relief) Battalion	311 personnel
Total	<u>1,527</u> personnel

For detail of the planned (proposed) organisation structure, see Annexure A hereto attached.

BASIC FORCE COMPOSITION

RDF Head Quarters and Support Staff

The HQ personnel would typically have had:

- Brigade commander
- Brigade second in command (Chief of Staff)
- Public relations personnel (Negotiator, Mediator, Legal Advisor)

Functional Support Staff

- ❖ Personnel
- ❖ Intelligence
- ❖ Operations
- ❖ Logistical
- ❖ Financial
- Domestic Base Support Staff
 - ❖ Communications
 - ❖ Catering
 - ❖ Stores

- ❖ Transport / Technical
- ❖ Engineers
- ❖ Medical

Air Wing

The Air Wing would be composed as follows:

- Air Wing Commander
- Mobile Air Operations Team (MAOT)
- Fixed Wing (Spotter) Airplane Crews
- Transport Helicopter Crews
- Attack Helicopter Crews
- Light/Medium Transport Airplane Crews
- Heavy Transport Airplane Crews
- Ground Technical Support Crews

Rapid Development (Peace Enforcement) Battalions

Each of the 3 x RDF Battalions would be organised as follows:

- Battalion Head Quarters and Support Staff
- Three rifle companies each
- Each rifle company has three rifle platoons and one light mortar section, each rifle platoon has three sections
- Each Battalion has organisationally attached:
 - ❖ Medium Mortar Platoon
 - ❖ LMG Platoon
 - ❖ Anti-tank Platoon
 - ❖ Assault Pioneer Platoon

Support (Disaster Relief) Battalion

The Support Battalion would be organised as follows:

- Battalion Head Quarters
- Engineers Company with a Demining-, Water Supply- and Construction Platoon
- Logistics company with a Transport-, Rations and Protection (Escort) Platoon
- Medical Platoon
- Communications Platoon
- Training Platoon
- Air Supply Platoon

EXECUTION OF THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

The Operational Concept would have made provision for the execution of the operation in four stages, as follows:

- Stage 1: Planning the Operation (D-14 to D Day)
- Stage 2: Mobilisation of Resources (D Day to D+29)
- Stage 3: Execution of the Operation (D+29 to D+152)
- Stage 4: De-mobilisation of Resources (D+152 to D+166)

STAGE 1: Planning the Operation (From D-14 to D Day)

During this stage the following activities would be envisaged:

- Development and presentation of a proposal to the UN and the Rwandan Government for authorised involvement in the Rwandan conflict
- Contracting with the UN/Rwandan Government
- Quick deployment of reconnaissance elements to gather information and to confirm the intelligence picture/situation

- ❑ Operational planning cycle to formulate a feasible, cost effective operational plan and alternatives to cater for every scenario
- ❑ Operational support plans to support a chosen course of action
- ❑ Management of the procurement of main equipment and support commodities
- ❑ Deployment of an advanced party to set up base camps in Kigali
- ❑ Recruitment and contracting of highly trained and skilled military personnel to man the organisation structure
- ❑ Equipping the force with personal- and combat equipment and quick training/re-training of personnel as required
- ❑ Issuing of orders for mobilisation and deployment of forces
- ❑ Final rehearsals and marrying-up

STAGE 2: Mobilisation of Resources (From D+1 to D+29)

During this stage the following activities would be envisaged: A four phased air movement and operational deployment of the RDF Bde to the Rwandan area of operation, as follows:

➤ Phase 1: (D Day to D+8)

Air movement and Deployment of Bde HQ, 1 RDF Bn and RDF Air Wing

- Procurement of logistics and stockpiling of goods in a demarcated area at Kigali International Airport (Military Air Base).
- Air movement of the Bde Head Quarters, RDF Air Wing (RDF AW) and 1 RDF Bn to Kigali. Issuing of main equipment, ammunition, logistical supplies, etc.
- Establish the Bde HQ at the base camp and set up a JOC and command and control structure.
- Operational deployment of 1RDF Bn supported by elements of the RDF AW in the Eastern Military Zone (Gisenyi, Kibuye & Cyangugu areas), to execute stabilisation actions to enforce peace in the region.

➤ **Phase 2: (D+8 to D+15)**

Air Movement and Deployment of the RDF Support Bn

- Continuous operational actions in the Eastern Military Zone by the 1 RDF Bn supported by the RDF AW.
- Continuous importation of logistics and the stockpiling of goods in the established logistical support base.
- Air movement of the RDF Support (Disaster Relief) Bn, to Kigali and issuing of main equipment upon arrival.
- Establishment of disaster relief camps at demarcated areas by the RDF Support Bn and the logistical stockpiling of goods for relief operations.
- Operational logistical support to the 1 RDF Bn and RDF AW to sustain operations.

➤ **Phase 3: (D+15 to D+22)**

Air Movement and Deployment of 2 RDF Bn

- Air movement of 2 RDF Bn to Kigali. Issuing of main equipment upon arrival.
- Operational deployment of 2 RDF Bn supported by elements of the RDF AW in the Southern Military Zone (Gikongoro, Butare and Nyanza areas) of Rwanda, to execute stabilisation actions to enforce peace in the region.

➤ **Phase 4: (D+22 to D+29)**

Air Movement and Deployment of 3 RDF Bn

- Air movement of 3 RDF Bn to Kigali. Issuing of main equipment upon arrival.
- Operational deployment of 3 RDF Bn supported by elements of the RDF AW in the Northern Military Zone (Ruhengeri and Byumba areas) of Rwanda, to execute stabilisation actions to enforce peace in the region.

STAGE 3: Execution of the Peace Enforcement Operation (From D+29 to D+152)

During this stage the following activities would be envisaged:

- Peace enforcement actions by the 3 x RDF Bns, under command of the RDF Bde HQ, supported by the RDF Air Wing and the RDF Support Bn in the eastern-, southern- and northern military zones of Rwanda, to stabilise and normalise the security situation by peace enforcement in the regions.
- Disaster and relief operations to refugees and victims of the genocide at demarcated disaster aid relief camps.
- Handing over security normalised areas to UN Peace Keepers to keep the peace.

STAGE 4: De-mobilisation of forces (From D+152 to D+166)

During this stage the following activities would be envisaged:

- Phased withdrawal of RDF Bde forces and elements from security stabilised and normalised areas after handing over the areas of responsibility to UN Peace Forces.
- Continuous provision of disaster aid relief services as part of the UN aid relief program for the area.
- Final de-mobilisation of the RDF Bde upon completion of the UN contract.


COST ANALYSIS

For a detailed projected cost analysis of the envisaged operation, see Annexure B hereto attached. The cost analysis is based on the pretext, that EO would be solely responsible for all the resources to successfully execute the peace enforcement operation, over a period of six months.

FC GROVÉ
Executive Outcomes
Former Chief of Staff

**EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES RAPID DEPLOYMENT BRIGADE:
PROPOSED STRUCTURE**

Summary of Personnel		
1. Bde HQ Staff	:	36
2. 1 RDF Bn	:	375
3. 2 RDF Bn	:	375
4. 3 RDF Bn	:	375
5. Support Bn	:	311
6. Air Wing	:	55
Total Personnel	:	1,527



**BROAD (BALL PARK) COST ANALYSIS (CASH FLOW) FOR THE STAFFING & EQUIPPING OF A
RAPID RESPONSE (LIGHT) BRIGADE, OVER A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS**

ANNEXURE B

SERIAL NO	COST / ITEM DESCRIPTION	IMPORT COST (USD) ONCE OFF FIRST MONTH	MONTHLY MAINTENANCE COST (USD)	TOTAL COST FOR 6 X MONTHS CONTRACT PERIOD (USD)
	a	b	c	d
1	Personnel Salaries (1,527 pers)	15,270,000.00	15,270,000.00	91,620,000.00
2	Vehicles	15,515,000.00	200,000.00	16,715,000.00
3	Weapons	1,310,000.00	20,000.00	1,430,000.00
4	Ammunition	3,122,000.00	1,000,000.00	8,122,000.00
5	Aircraft	13,000,000.00		13,000,000.00
6	Special Equipment	500,000.00	20,000.00	600,000.00
7	Uniforms Complete	1,200,000.00	20,000.00	1,800,000.00
8	Camping Equipment	2,000,000.00	100,000.00	2,600,000.00
9	Medical Equipment	100,000.00	50,000.00	1,250,000.00
10	Medicine	200,000.00	20,000.00	300,000.00
11	Aircraft Spares and Maintenance	2,000,000.00	200,000.00	2,600,000.00
12	POL vehicles	200,000.00	200,000.00	1,200,000.00
13	Jet A-1, lubricants	400,000.00	400,000.00	2,400,000.00
14	Air-technical Support	100,000.00	50,000.00	350,000.00
15	Rations	320,000.00	320,000.00	1,920,000.00
16	Domestic Air Transport for Personnel	667,000.00	100,000.00	1,167,000.00
17	Office Equipment and IT	100,000.00	10,000.00	150,000.00
18	Training Aids	50,000.00	10,000.00	100,000.00
19	Vehicles Spares and Maintenance	100,000.00	20,000.00	200,000.00
20	Security Equipment	50,000.00	20,000.00	150,000.00
21	Electronic Support Equipment	100,000.00	10,000.00	150,000.00
22	Ops Centre + Comms Equipment	120,000.00	20,000.00	170,000.00
23	Stationary	20,000.00	5,000.00	45,000.00
24	Medivac System	200,000.00	50,000.00	300,000.00
25	Combat + Personal Equipment	1,527,000.00	20,000.00	1,627,000.00
26	Engineers Equipment	200,000.00	35,000.00	235,000.00
TOTAL CASH FLOW (USD)		58,371,000.00	18,170,000.00	150,201,000.00

Conclusion

Once-off purchase of main equipment: USD 43,101,000.00 (could remain the property of the UN, according to the terms of the contract).

Average monthly cost: USD 18,170,000.00

Average daily cost: USD 605,666.66

Please note that the current UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone is costing the UN +/- USD 3 Million per day, for personnel allowances and logistical maintenance only. (Excluding the cost of main equipment)

