A Major Obstacle to African Unity: the New Franco-American Cold War on the Continent
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In spite of the relief the end of the Cold War was expected to bring in Africa, and at a time when discussions about a potential unity of the continent re-emerge, it appears that Africa is more than ever plagued by interstate and internal conflicts, while almost half of its population lives in absolute poverty.

A closer look at Africa’s strife reveals a systematic involvement of foreign powers and their transnational companies, and especially of the United States and France. When talking about unity, it is important to assess the exact role they play in the continent’s divisions. A detailed analysis of the two powers’ interventions since 1990, and even before, reveals a systematic and violent confrontation for hegemony comparable to that of the Cold War.

French and American African Foreign Policies in pursuit of Africa’s Riches

The French African Policy: Predation and Exclusivism
There is a permanent reluctance among academics to call a spade a spade and a predatory (or imperialist) policy as such. In the case of the French Foreign Policy in Africa, very few academics have pointed at the dramatic consequences of it, and even fewer have been prepared to describe them as resulting from deliberate criminal choices aimed at fostering a small minority’s interests, at any cost.

The Relative Decline in Importance of Africa for French Traditional Interests
The French African Policy has been supporting three major objectives since the African independences, which don’t seem to carry as much weight as previously. France used its influence on African countries to secure its international status as a medium-power. But the end of the Cold War, as well as the building of an economically and gradually politically powerful European Union, in which France is one of the main decision-maker, reduce the need for France of an African support in international negotiations.

Another reason for the French policy on the African continent was its dependency on a number of raw materials and energy resources for its high-technology industries, and the need, therefore, to secure a permanent, and cheap, access to these materials. Indeed, with an energetic
dependency as high as 80% (in 1989), France still needs to maintain close ties with African suppliers. However, these strategic resources are not threatened any more by pro-USSR interests, can be obtained on international markets at cheap prices or replaced by synthetic surrogates.

Finally, the third purpose of the French policy in francophone African States, as reflected in expressions such as “Chasse-guardée” (exclusive hunting ground) or “pré-carré” (natural preserve), was also to defend an exclusivity on markets and riches of these States for French firms. Cheap labour, cheap raw materials and a captive market for food and manufactured products are still today the main economic advantages offered to hundreds of French businesses present in the Franc Zone. France’s balance of trade with francophone Africa has always been and remains, today, positive.\(^2\)

However, as underlined by Cruise O’Brien, “France’s commercial interest in Africa has markedly declined since the time of African independence : thus French exports to the Etats Africains et Malgache were halved over the period 1960-1979, and imports from the same states reduced to one third of their previous level.” Indeed, Africa now accounts for less than 5% of France’s foreign trade and receives less than 20% of France’s foreign direct investment, far behind Eastern Europe and Asia.\(^3\) If these commercial interests shouldn’t be discarded simply because they are smaller now than before, they fail however to explain France’s enormous involvement in Africa.

**In Defense of the Economic Interests of the Few**

France is currently the continent’s first partner in terms of aid and military cooperation. 50% of the French Official Development Aid (ODA) is dedicated to Sub-Saharan Africa, and amounted to 18 billion Francs (or Rands) in 1998. The bigger share of it is going to francophone Africa. As a matter of fact, eventhough the Franc Zone\(^4\) only represents as little as 2% of French External Trade, it receives still 50% of its ODA.

The explanation for the discrepancy between the declining interest of Africa and the priority given to these countries in the ODA lies in the way the African policy is designed and implemented by very few actors and for their interests only. These actors concentrate on the diversion of two rents, that linked to the monopolistic exploitation of African raw materials and public procurements by few French transnational corporations\(^5\), and that of the Official Development Aid by a fraction of the French and African political, business and military elites, all working hand in hand to avoid external competition and controls\(^6\).
On top of the diversion of crucial resources, some of these actors are also heavily involved in criminal activities made possible by the protection of the French government and its support to francophone African regimes. Many smugglings are taking place in francophone African countries, with obvious government's support, such as elephants' defenses in Gabon, fake money in Chad, Djibouti or Zaire, gold and diamonds in Zaire and today's DRC, stolen commodities, etc. Drug smuggling\(^7\), weapon smuggling, prostitution\(^8\), and money laundering (thanks to the protected convertibility of CFA Francs into French Francs) are also widely spread all over francophone Africa, and some anglophone countries where the pro-French networks have been involved.

In many instances, these activities contribute, on the French side, to fund political parties and careers. Names of current dictators Omar Bongo, in Gabon, or J. Eyadema in Togo, are commonly given as examples of heads of States giving back some part of the French ODA, as well as some parts of their illegal incomes to sponsor their French political mentors of the “Socialist” Party or of the conservative RPR and UDF\(^9\).

The systematic support of pro-French elites through maffia-like relationships.

Pro-French elites in Africa are selected through various means, including the promotion of French language (as opposed to English), in general, and the maintenance of close relations between the main actors, including heads of states. These relations are very similar to those in force in crime syndicates, with the promotion of a fake friendship based on the share out of riches, private meetings involving exchanges of gifts or supply of prostitutes, implying in return a secrecy linking accomplices, and even familial ties, with, for instance, current French President being the godfather of one of Senegalese President Abdou Diouf’s daughters\(^10\).

These “special relations” are reinforced in some cases by a common belonging to a lodge in the Free-Maconery. African Heads of State such as Chadian Idriss Deby, Burkinabe Blaise Compaoré or Congolese Denis Sassou Nguesso belong to the right-wing Grande Loge Nationale de France, where they socialize with two former Ministries of Co-operation, the former head of some French secret services, ambassadors and personal advisers such as Fernand Wibaux, or former right-wing extremist, all related directly to the French African policy and its dirty tricks.

As the loyalty of pro-French elites is essential, it is greatly remunerated and explains partly the fortunes made by dictators such as Houphouet-Boigny or Mobutu, both estimated to have
owned more than 10 billion French Francs. An other strongman of the Francophonie, Omar Bongo, was “only” possessing, in 1997, 1.2 billion Francs.

Of course, the best protection enjoyed by pro-French regimes in Africa is the military support guaranteed to them through various agreements. Between 1960 and 1993, 8 defense agreements were signed in Africa, and 24 other agreements involving military (technical) assistance. In fact, there would be about 38 countries “benefitting” from the French military cooperation. These agreements include the protection from agressions, the supply of weapons, logistical support to courts and police units, the training of soldiers and officers, and the organisation and management of “presidential guards”, the most loyal troops. They also integrate the promise of a safe escape, if things were to turn nasty, for the dictator and his friends.\(^{11}\)

**Changes and Continuity of the French African Policy**

The reformation of the French African Policy was discussed when the Rwandese genocide, with France’s collaboration, revealed its odious dimension. In a bid to regain some credibility, as well as to adapt to the new globalisation, which means public deficits reduction, but also to take into consideration American hegemony in world affairs, France had to accomodate its policy. The new request for “good economic governance”, or “Abidjan doctrine”, leading to the mobilisation of International Financial Organisations to force francophone African authorities into economic austerity, and the focus on multilateralism for conflict-resolution, are the major reforms introduced in the new policy.\(^{12}\)

But the traditional policy objective, the preservation of a very profitable status quo, remains unchanged. The recent closing of the two French military bases in the Central African Republic, and the planned reduction in the number of French soldiers stationned in Africa to 5000, shouldn’t be misinterpreted. France equipped itself in 1993 with a Rapid-Deployment Force of 15000 paratroopers able to intervene anywhere on the continent within 48 hours. At the same time, while the cooperation’s budget for Africa is decreasing, its military component is increasing substantially\(^{13}\). 780 million FF were spent in 1999 for training (20% of the budget), and to finance 7 Military Schools provided to pro-French regimes.\(^{14}\) And military agreements protecting pro-French regimes are still in force.

*The Anglo-Saxon Threat to French Exclusivity in Francophone Africa*
The rivalry in international affairs, between France and the USA is nothing new. De Gaulle’s foreign policy, for example, was mainly about fighting American influence and interferences, in Europe with NATO as well as in the Middle-East or South-East Asia.

With the end of the Cold War the list of disagreements between the USA and France increased. France and the USA clashed about the liberalisation of cultural goods, knowing both that the spread of culture goes with that of values and economic powership. They clashed again about NATO’s strategies and leadership, in 1996, and again for the appointment of the new UN Secretary-General, after B. Boutros-Ghali.

US threat is a genuine concern for French authorities, as admitted by Michel Roussin, then Minister of Co-operation : a series of meetings were held at the highest levels of the French Government, in 1993-1994, to discuss strategies to defend French interests against those of the US. While visiting Gabon in July 1995, President Jacques Chirac verbally attacked “the Anglosaxons (who) dream of pushing France out of its position in Africa without paying a price”.

As a matter of fact, France’s influence in Africa is fragile and the wave of democratisation, unleashed by the withdrawal of Soviets from the continent, together with the worsening of the economic crisis in francophone Africa, has led to new demands and the search for alternatives to the French domination. In that respect, pro-French networks are also right to perceive any US political intervention, or economic penetration in the continent as a danger for their interests, inasmuch as it can be used by African elites and peoples against them.

American presence in Africa is also a threat to the expansion of these networks, who are investing (politically, economically and militarily) more and more in Anglophone Africa. France is already exporting more to countries out of the Franc Zone, and included this dimension fully in the designing of the new African policy.

But is the American threat serious enough to explain the brutality of the pro-French response, or is this response disproportionate ? Does France’s huge political, financial and military investment against American interests correspond to an exaggeration of the threat ? I argue that it rather means that the stakes are simply considered much higher on the French side, for the time being, because of the fact that the African continent is the only place where France and the pro-French networks can retain such a political and economic monopoly. As it will be discussed in the last part of this paper, it seems also that France, loosing the political or moral battle, is trying to win the military battle on the ground, in mobilising all its allies and means in a “total strategy”.


The American Foreign Policy in Africa: Marginal? But for how long?

Africa is indeed a marginal area of interest for US policy-makers

After World War two, if the African continent got fully integrated into the Cold War, the USA delegated the containment of communism to former colonial powers, intervening only where these powers seemed to fail to do so with sufficient efficiency or competed directly with US interests, as in Zaire in 1960-63.

However, US ODA doubled between 1980 and 1989, with a share directed to francophone Africa twice bigger (26% in 1988). But 40% of this aid to francophone Africa was monopolised by former Zaire, the richest country in the Francophone zone in terms of natural resources.

With the end of the Cold War, the African policy remained marginal. In 1994, US investments in Sub-Saharan Africa were about one third of those directed to Brazil alone. For sure, the difficulties encountered by American businesses to invest in francophone countries (half of the continent) due to the heavy control and quasi-exclusivity of the French networks, play a role. Consequently, America’s economic assistance to Africa, which had reached 6 billion dollars by 1980, declined from 1985 to 1995 in both aggregate terms and as a percentage of the US foreign aid budget (from 10.3% to 6.03%). By 1995, for the first time ever, US assistance aid to Africa was lower than that of France (which had increased a lot in the period, however). US aid in Africa was representing only 7% of all US ODA.

But if the marginalisation of the continent in the US foreign policy has been widely analysed, whether the American business sector is happy with that or not hasn’t been much investigated and shouldn’t for sure be taken for granted.

Africa is still important for American interests, and will be more and more in the future

As acknowledged by Huliaras and others, direct US involvement in Africa was also driven by economic interests. As for the French, a major objective of US involvement was to maintain access to minerals, at a cheap price. Eventhough Western countries rely less and less on raw materials, their level of dependence is still relatively important, as shown by the war waged against Iraq in 1990-91\(^{15}\).
These economic interests didn’t disappear with the collapse of USSR. Privileged access to raw materials is still a strategic interest as well as a major source of profits for few American transnational corporations, in the field of telecommunications, transport, mining, oil...

Apart from these US official economic interests on the continent, the US also developed highly profitable links with African regimes or guerillas, providing financial support and weapons during the Cold War, to fuel the many “low-intensity wars”. Between 1969 and 1992, the USA exported 4,4 million landmines to 32 or more countries, many of them in Africa. US mines were used in most of Africa’s conflicts. This trade was of course very profitable. As a matter of fact, France and the USA are among the 6 main suppliers of weapons to the continent, and therefore benefit also from purchases and public procurements commonly linked to the supply of weapons to friendly regimes.

At the same time, new opportunities emerged in Africa, specially in the second half of the 1990s, after the implementation of the IMF’s Structural Adjustments Programmes. The SAPs forced African countries to open their markets to foreign investors and to privatize their public assets. As a result of this, the profitability of investments in Africa is now the highest in the world. On US direct investments, it was as high as 25.3% average in 1997. Stock-markets have been established in 14 African countries under International Financial Institutions’ supervision, and in some of them annual returns of about 100% have been made. And the relative stability of francophone states make them particularly attractive for foreign investors.

On top of its mining opportunities, the continent offers interesting agricultural opportunities, “such as the plantations or outgrower production of tea, coffee, cocoa, cotton, sugar, and the like” as well as “some low-tech manufacturing for local markets, such as beer and soft drinks, plastics and cement, and a very limited amount of export manufacturing (eg textile) by subsidiaries of foreign firms, especially under the Lomé Convention which gives African countries special access to European markets”16.

In 1995, US investments in Sub-Saharan Africa were representing 3,5 billion dollars. In 1996, they had reached 4,5 billion dollars, and trade with the continent superseded that with Russia and the East European countries altogether in 1997-1998.

The American foreign policy becomes more clearly Business-orientated, but also more hostile to French interests
Many academics underline the fact that with the end of the Cold War the American foreign policy became more business-orientated\(^\text{17}\). This new dynamics is reflected by Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s declaration that he was to “make no apologies for putting economics at the top of (the American) foreign policy agenda”. Considering how much US economy’s growth relies on exports and imports (one \(\frac{1}{4}\) of the US GDP in 1992), this relation between foreign policy and economic interests is no surprise.

The 1992 US intervention in Somalia is often analysed as a failure which contributed further to US disengagement in Africa. But analysts fail to explain, precisely, the reason for this intervention. Operation Restore Hope was costful and implied a high political risk. It can only be understood as a clear sign of US interest for African affairs. And the operation’s failure, undeniable, doesn’t mean that the US will necessarily disengage from the continent. It probably merely convinced the USA that indirect intervention was much less damaging politically, much less costly, far more successful and should be preferred in the future.

As a matter of fact, Africa gradually regained importance in the American foreign policy in the second half of the 1990s under the influence of the business sector, however in the mid of a general confusion, and policy reassessment, prevailing at that time among US decision-makers. Indeed, as Schraeder analyses in 1995, “this re-emphasised economic component of American foreign policy is to strengthen further the small but growing expansion into francophone Africa of certain key US industries, most notably oil and telecommunications, that has accompanied the end of the Cold War.”\(^\text{18}\)

In the process, US officials start to express publicly their hostility toward French monopolistic presence in Africa. Former Assistant Secretary of State of African Affairs H. Cohen, in a conference held in Gabon in 1994 to strengthen US-African trade and investments, explains that the US can “no longer afford to accept France’s determination to maintain its priviledged *chasse gardée*”.\(^\text{19}\) In October 1996, Warren Christopher, while visiting Mali to promote the idea of an African Peace-Keeping force, declares that “the time (was) past when outside powers could consider whole groups of countries as their own private domain”. In parallel, US diplomats start to exert pressure on francophone leaders to sign contracts with US companies. Even in the pro-French stronghold of Zaire, USA gradually takes over from France as the leading trade partner.
In a continent saturated by French interests and influence, and in a context of growing hostility between France and the USA, a limited allocation of aid seems to represent the most efficient strategy for Americans to pursue in Africa. During the Cold War, US decision-makers adopted such a low-profile in the Eastern block, as any direct intrusion would have been highly risky, and a *casus belli* for the Soviets. Instead, the USA forwarded issues such as human rights and the liberation of Eastern European dissidents. The demand for democratisation re-emerging after 1990 in Africa made possible a similar strategy.

In numerous francophone countries, “relatively small but effective amounts of ODA from the US have been designated to facilitate the transition to democracy (e.g sending representatives to monitor elections), as well as to consolidate successful transitions that have already taken place.” As noted by Schraeder, US strategy is “indicative of calculations... that the promotion of democracy (i.e. the emergence of new ruling elites) throughout francophone Africa is a very low-cost strategy with potentially high returns (i.e. a new, more pro-US regime may be installed).”

**A Franco-American Cold War**

Following the critical perspectives on the USA-USSR Cold War, according to which the political and ideological discourse accompanying the confrontation was aimed at masking the pursuit of purely economic interests through the imposition of social systems to allies and dominated countries I argue that the rivalry between France and the USA has turned into a new Cold War in Africa. The previous Cold War saw USA and USSR fighting each other by any means necessary, to seek both political and, thus, economic control over new territories. However, direct confrontations were avoided, as they would have caused damages exceeding by far the gains, and low-intensity conflicts preferred.

Confrontation didn’t prevent the two superpowers from cooperating when necessary, like in the Suez crisis. It didn’t prevent neither their allies from playing them off, as Nasser did when Western countries refused their support for some of his projects.

The growing rivalry between the USA and France in Africa is in many respects if not all comparable to the previous Cold War. If French interventions in Africa never hesitated to use any means necessary to counter American influence, the US, on the other side, have adopted a more cautious approach, as their interests on the continent are not yet as important and couldn’t justify the same level of intervention. But the previous Cold War also divided the world into spheres of
influences considered as essential by one or the other rival, and therefore deserving a different attention. The USA maintained hegemonic control upon South and Central America, while USSR secured territories in central Asia. Direct confrontations were always avoided, as showed in Vietnam, where USSR allowed American intervention, or in Afghanistan, where the USA allowed the Russian one.

The New Cold War-approach enables to see how determined France is to keep control of francophone African countries, its own backyard, while the USA are getting more and more involved, in pursuit of the same economic interests.

**Ideological tools to construct an image and hide economic interests.**

Confrontations require discourses, whether to hide true motives or to legitimate actions, in both cases to gain the “hearts and minds” of people concerned of affected. The French discourse is logically the most constructed of both, as it has been shaped over a period of several decades. On the contrary, the American discourse is still in a process of being finalised, as the continent gets more and more attention.

**The Anglo-Saxon conspiracy against La Francophonie**

As the French are much more engaged in a “total strategy” against the American influence in Africa, their discourse is really similar to that of the USA at the time of the Soviet-American Cold War. The eneny is perceived as heading a conspiracy plotting to eradicate all French presence from the continent, in “developing an arc of influence from Ethiopia and Erytrea via Uganda, Rwanda and Zaire to Congo and Cameroon”. Follows the familiar rationale of the “domino theory”, assuming that the fall of one of the pro-French African regimes, or the failure to rescue it by French authorities and army, would lead to the collapse of the Francophone alliance. This theory received a stricking support from the events in the Great Lake region, which saw the fall, to the pro-American Tutsi-led FPR, of Habyarimana’s regime in Rwanda leading to that of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, also in favour of a pro-American regime, as well as the destabilisation of the Republic of Congo, Burundi, and to a lesser extend of the Central African Republic.

**Humanitarian concern**
Humanitarian concern is always at the heart of any discourse on Africa, a key word for any intervention whatsoever. A first and traditional humanitarian concern used to legitimate interventions in Africa is, as acknowledged by current French Ministry of Interior J-P Chevenement, before the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry on Rwanda, to help fellow French people in Africa. France has dispatched “cooperants” (and their families) all over the continent, with communities as big as that of Ivory Coast, comprising more than 50 000 people.

Another humanitarian concern used to mobilise support for interventions (of any sort) in Africa is the assistance to population facing a danger, be it starvation, war... Such a manipulation of public sensibility took place in 1994, when pro-French networks spread the news of a second genocide organised by the new Tutsi regime against the Hutu refugees on the border with Zaire. A lot was said about deadly diseases and massacres threatening the refugees in the area. Thus legitimised, the French operation Turquoise was launched to secure the area and enable pro-French elements to escape and re-arm. Later, humanitarian symbols were used to hide weapons’ supplies to Mobutu’s army.

La Francophonie as a family; African-Americans and Africa

Decades of French colonial influence, and cultural promotion, together with the implementation of “special relations” with francophone African leaders, authorised a discourse describing La Francophonie, that is, really, the African francophonie, as a family, with France as a natural tutor. In some cases, true family relations were established, as seen previously.

The counterpart of La Francophonie, and a much more recent creation, would be the American discourse on the would be special relationship existing between African-Americans and African people. This is nothing new. The CIA had already tried to establish that kind of special connections between prominent conservative African-Americans and African leaders in various sectors of the society. These attempts have regained some importance after the collapse of USSR, with the creation of African/African-American summits, in 1991. These annual summits were originally designed to develop cultural ties, just like the Francophonie but have soon shifted to the support of trade and investment between the US and the black continent. However, the discourse is still there.

Democratisation and Peace
The promotion of democracy in Africa is an other rhetorical tool to justify US and French interferences in Africa and to exert some pressure on African governments when necessary. France started to insist on democratisation after 1990, when President Mitterrand, at the La Baule Franco-African Summit, promised that all aid provided to African States would be conditioned to efforts to democratise. France never delivered, but the “La Baule doctrine” continued to be use in public discourses.

For the USA, this discourse is much easier to sustain, as they can really afford, in many cases, to support democratic movements. Indeed, as new comers on the continent, they haven’t secured yet any “private hunting ground” and therefore can most of the time genuinely support democratisation, especially in the francophone region, where it is rightfully associated to an “anti-French opposition”. However, their support for anti-French regimes or guerillas such as those of Rwanda, Uganda or the AFDL of L-D Kabila (in 1996-1997) shows how instrumental the objective of democratization remains.

The promotion of peace is an other theme used to interfere in continental affairs. It is difficult to imagine a peace accord which wouldn’t have been supported by one or the other contender. Eventhough France still enjoys a monopoly on any peace negociations in most francophone states, like Djibouti, it is getting more and more difficult for it to impose itself in war-torn central Africa, where the USA are pushing their own agenda, as well as in some francophone states such as Morocco (Western Sahara’s conflict).

It is important to note that none of these two promoters of peace are involved in the conflicts they pretend to solve the conflict, but still pretend to play a neutral role for the benefit of all.

Aids and the War on Drugs
The Aids pandemia is killing African people in their thousands. Very recently, the US administration has realised the potential of Aids as a way to penetrate Africa. The USA have declared January 2000 to be the month of Africa at the UN, as Bill Clinton’s administration was ordering an increase in its spending for Aids victims in Africa and Asia by 125 million dollars, roughly 10 dollars per person infected on the two continents.

The mobilisation against world drug trafficking is already an old theme of US diplomacy, which proved very useful to justify constant interference in internal policies of sovereign states in South America. A system of certification according to the committment of a specific country in the war
against drugs has been established, and linked to the continuation of aid. This is being used “to gain leverage over foreign governments without appearing as crude ‘realpolitik’. Drug control allows the gunboats to sail under UN flags”. Indeed, to get certified, African states where illegal drugs are produced or merely transited have to open their territories to US DEA agents and UN specialised personels and accept a “continuous interference in national affairs”. Such personnels are currently present in Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Senegal. Of course, “certification can be provided regardless of government involvement in narcotics, if US national interest demands it”. This tool had been used in Africa since the early 1990s. For instance, the Nigerian military regime was decertified in 1994, and thus lost the support of US aid as well as that of the IMF and the World Bank, in spite of huge efforts to tackle drug production and trafficking, simply because of political reasons, among them, probably, the fact that the regime wasn’t a pro-American one but rather a pro-French one.

**Military Involvement**

Just like the previous Cold War, military involvement is high, as long as it doesn't lead to a direct confrontation between the two super-powers.

**Direct Interventions of the Military : the costful solution**

For decades, France has been the only country, of the two, able or willing to intervene militarily in Africa. It has opened military bases and troops in several francophone countries and signed numerous military agreements with the francophone African countries, allowing such interventions on request. 34 military interventions at least of French troops took place on Africa’s soil between 1963 and 1997, always to defend pro-French regimes against their opponents. In the 1990s, French troops have been increasingly involved in interventions aimed at fighting pro-American guerillas, such as in Rwanda (twice) against the Rwandan Patriotic Front, or in former Zaire (Operation Turquoise), where French intervention, weapons and instructors made possible the re-organisation of 17 000 extremist Hutus and their militias in the Central African Republic. But the political cost of this involvement proved high, as it discredited the French African policy. Some French political actors even had to answer for their role during the genocide before a parliamentary commission of enquiry.

However important the cost might have been, the creation of the rapid-Deployment Force as well as the increase of the military component of the French cooperation in Africa show for sure
that France doesn’t intend to disengage militarily from the continent. There will be other direct interventions, or discreet involvement such as that of French military helicopters penetrating the Congo territory from Gabon, in 1998, to spy movements of the rebels and report to Sassou Nguesso.

On the other side, the USA, as newcomers on the continent, have no “tradition” of military intervention in this part of the world. They have to be more cautious, as they don’t want to appear to threaten directly French interests or to want to lead an imperialistic policy in Africa, which would alienate African masses. They also have to deal with a public opinion, at home, which hasn’t been sensitized to African problems, and is therefore difficult to mobilize over Africa’s problems. Finally, the failure of the 1992-1993 intervention in Somalia (where they had established 2 military bases), as stated earlier, makes future direct military interventions less likely. Instead, they might choose to drop bombs, without deploying any troops, as they did on Libya in 1986, and again on Sudan in retaliation for anti-US bomb attacks occurred in Kenya and Tanzania. However, pro-French networks are well aware of the 6 military agreements at least signed with African countries and the numerous military bases established across the continent, which show a military commitment to the continent that could well be activated if considered necessary.24

Direct Involvement Through Military Instructors and Secret Services
A much favoured means to intervene in African affairs has been the use of military instructors and secret services, together with the supply of military equipment. Most of the military agreements signed with France encompass the training of the army and/or of the Presidential Guard, and that of the local secret services by French experts. Dictator Idriss Deby himself was trained in a French military school, as well as former dictator J-B Bokassa or Togolese one Eyadema. In 1997, there were French military advisers and instructors in at least 19 francophone African countries, some of them training death squads. It is estimated that by 1992, 40 000 African officers had been trained by France.25

The USA are also deeply involved in the military support, through instructors, advisers and the supply of equipment, of their allies in Africa. Before 1994, the USA have supported pro-American regime of Yoweri Museveni, in Uganda, who in return supported, with the green light of the US, the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s guerilla against neighbouring pro-French regime in Rwanda. The cooperation proved successful, as the RPF managed to take over from the extremist hutus.
Then, as acknowledged officially in 1997, US involvement in the region carried on, with the training of Rwandese new armed forces and Kabila’s troops in their war against Mobutu’s regime in Zaire, in 1996-1997, a period during which they both committed grave human rights violations. An impressive and highly sophisticated system of communication was put in place to spy the whole region, with two US transmission stations in Uganda and Rwanda, and a third one, on a US military boat off the Republic of Congo’s coast. The training of Rwandese troops by US military instructors, to be sent to fight in the DRC, continued in 1998 and 1999 at least.26

CIA instructors and weapons have also been reported since several years in Sudan, where the intelligence agency is supporting the guerilla war of the SPLA (Sudanese People Liberation Army) against the islamist regime, which happens to be pro-French. In return, French secret agents based in the neighbouring Central African Republic have helped the Sudanese army with training and intelligence on the SPLA.

*When Direct Involvement is not Feasible, Mercenaries can be sent instead*

Even though the USA have on occasions, like in Angola, made use of mercenaries from US firms or South African ones to protect installations, they have almost never resorted to such firms to help allies or overthrow hostile African governments. On the contrary, pro-French networks have made it their speciality to recruit right-wing extremists to give a hand to pro-French regimes or guerillas, whenever official intervention was not feasible or politically safe. Working hand in hand with the French secret services, they became famous in Comoros, where they helped organise military coups, on command, and even took power to rule the island by themselves. The last coup took place no longer than 5 years ago, in September 1995.

In the 1990s, the French networks provided mercenaries for Mobutu, in 1996 (300 men, mostly French, with some war criminals coming from Serbia), and Sassou Nguesso, in 1997 (with a financial help from O. Bongo). The use of mercenaries can turn around a defavourable situation, or prolong a war to get a better deal when negociations start, or, also, to send formal soldiers disguised as mercenaries, as in Zaire in 1996 (more than a hundred commandos).

*Political Support*

The weaker the allies are, the less legitimate they appear, the more political recognition they need from their American or French tutor. Political support can be expressed through various ways.
Direct involvement in Electoral Processes

The renewed demand for democracy in Africa after 1990, together with the common discourse promoting democratisation advocated by the US and France make it necessary for their allies to organise elections to pretend to be democratic. Thus the pro-French networks, who were used to organise rigged elections in Africa, intervened even more after 1990 to ensure the victory of their allies. The French secret services gave a hand to Togolese dictator Eyadema to organise fraudulent elections in 1993 and again in 1998. In Cameroon, Paul Biya also enjoyed the permanent support of French experts at time of elections, to deprive his main opponent, pro-US John Fru Ndi, of a legitimate victory, in particular in 1997. Same in Niger and Chad in 1996, or in Gabon, where O. Bongo got reelected for the 6th time in December 1998. Each time, the electoral campaigns suffered from intimidations, suppression of democratic freedoms, and murders.

As said before, the USA are in a more comfortable position in Africa when it comes to democratisation and elections, because they were having, until recently, very few pro-American regimes in place on the continent and therefore could afford encouraging genuine democratic oppositions. The USA thus brought their support to democratic (and therefore mainly pro-US, or anti-French) oppositions in Cameroon, Congo, Ivory Coast, Togo and Benin. Some of the anti-French candidates, such as Ivorian Alassane Ouattara or Beninian Nicephore Soglo had been trained in the USA. Whenever candidates managed to get elected democratically, like in 1991 in Benin (Nicephore Soglo) or in the Republic of Congo in 1992 (Pascal Lissouba), they established new links with the US. To prevent election-rigging, US observers are being sent, like Jimmy Carter or General Collin Powell in the recent elections in Nigeria, who terminated officially pro-French dictatorship of Sani Abacha.

Political Support/Political exclusion

During the Cold War, as the policing of the continent had been more or less delegated to former colonial powers, no American presidents paid any visits to African countries, except for a 3-day visit to Nigeria and Liberia of President Carter. Therefore, Bill Clinton's visit in 1998 was an important sign of a renewed interest for the continent’s affairs. While touring some of the African countries, Bill Clinton called for a partnership with the “new leaders”, i.e. pro-American or potentially so Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles
Zenawi, and Rwandan vice-president Paul Kagame. In war-torn Algeria, the USA supported a negotiated settlement between Islamists and the military regime, to decide the re-organisation of democratic elections. US diplomacy declared it would recognise a democratically elected Islamist government. Such a government would be for sure anti-French, due to France’s support to the military regime.

France also proved ready to engage its credibility in supporting officially pro-French regimes as criminal as the extremist government which took over immediately after the killing of Rwandese dictator Habyarimana, in Rwanda, or that of Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha, ostracised by the international community after the hanging of opponents, but visited by President Chirac shortly after, and then invited to the Franco-African Summit of 1996. The next year, France was still supporting politically Mobutu, claiming he had to be part of any solution to the civil war in Zaire.

In direct opposition to American diplomacy, France brought increasing support to Libyan dictator Quadaffi. In 1986, France prohibited US planes from using French sky to fly to, and bomb, Tripoli. When France shifted its support to pro-Libyan Chadian leader Idris Deby, in 1990, bilateral relations increased. Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited his French counterpart in summer 1998. French holding Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux then got public contracts in Libya.

Political support becomes embarrassing when the regime’s crimes are receiving publicity. Thus, when Human Right watchdog Amnesty International published a documented report on the extent of barbaric practices of Eyadema’s regime, French president Chirac accused the organisation of lying and encouraged Eyadema to sue it in defamation, not to lose face.

Other ways are used to bring or withdraw political support, such as the exclusion of the new (and pro-American) Rwandese regime from the 1994 Franco-African Summit, the exclusion and re-integration after allegiance of Laurent Kabila’s DRC from the Franc Zone, the suspension of US aid to former allies Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Zaire and guerilla movement UNITA in the early 1990s, the granting of exile to allies, when overthrown, as Paul Biya, or potential allies, as in the case of the leader of the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces, fighting a pro-French regime, Senegal, but however in exile in France, or in that of two French citizens who obtained political asylum in the USA in the 1990s because they knew too much about the involvement of French high-profile officials in drug-trafficking with Morocco and other countries, and feared for their lives.29 Political support can also be brought through influential political parties or elected groups, such as the Afro-American caucus, in the US Congress, which supported L-D Kabila in his early days in power, or
the French Socialist and conservative parties, who supported respectively Abdou Diouf and his rival Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal’s recent presidential election.

**Instrumentalisation of Friendly States and Guerilla Movements**

To achieve their economic and strategic interests in Africa, the two rivals have to rely on allies, whether states, guerillas, or mere opponents. The artificiality of most of the continent’s states makes it easy for major foreign powers to influence African politics. The economic grips of France and, increasingly, the USA on some of the African countries make it also very easy for them to dictate their conditions. France is for instance the first supplier of Guinea-Conackry, the second main customer, the first provider of financial support, and the first investor. What kind of independence political authorities in such a poor country can retain?

Of course, in these matters as in every economic partnership, the number of allies, or partners, depends heavily on the size of the investment, the risks one seems to be prepared to take, and therefore the share of profits one can distribute. As the main investor in this new Cold War, France gets more countries and other partners on its side than the USA.

**The French connection**

In the context of general confrontation with American interests, as in the past, the French networks try to ensure a de facto political, financial and/or military solidarity between francophone states, first, and between these states and other pro-French African elites and guerillas.

Examples are plenty of political support brought by pro-French regimes to other pro-French allies. Fleeing his country, Zairian dictator Mobutu took refuge in Morocco, then ruled by the pro-French king Hassan II. Many Mobutist generals found a safe heaven in the neighbouring, and pro-French, Chad. Before being overthrown, Mobutu had allowed pro-French mass murderers from Rwanda to use his territory to re-organise and launch attacks against the new tutsi regime. Relations between the pro-French extremist hutus in Rwanda and Mobutu’s regime were few years old, as Mobutu’s presidential guard had been engaged against the Tutsis of the RPF in 1990. When confronted to Kabila’s guerilla, Mobutu was therefore provided with hutu soldiers to defend his regime, in March 1997.

The new relation between France and Libya offers an other good example of such solidarity. The French networks had since the 1960s looked for ways to provoke the balkanisation of pro-
American regimes, Nigeria being the first target, but Liberia being an other objective. The war waged by C. Taylor in Liberia, in 1989, with military support from pro-French Ivory Coast and Burkina Faso, falls under this strategy, and gave way to highly profitable smugglings. Quaddafi gave a hand to pro-French rebel leader in equipping and training his army. The war was then exported to the neighbouring pro-American Sierra Leone, in 1991, still with the support of pro-French networks and that of mass murderers of the RUF\textsuperscript{30}. Quaddaffi’s pro-French shift enabled him to break away from international isolation. In defiance of American disapproval and a UN air-embargo, pro-French presidents of Niger, Chad, and Burkina Faso all paid tribute to the leader by demonstratively flying to Tripoli in September 1998, for a mini-summit on the DRC’s war.

Military support comprises the provision of weapons and military training and that of soldiers against the partner’s enenemies. Since 1994, France hasn’t spared any effort to regain control of the Great Lakes’ region, encouraging its allies to join the war against pro-US Rwanda and Uganda, and managing to turn Kabila against his former allies. Chad, for instance delivered on request weapons coming from Libya and Sudan to Mobutu's proponents in 1996-97, lent soldiers to pro-French Niger to fight Tubu rebels, in 1997, and to Denis Sassou Nguesso, in Congo, where they fought along side with Moroccan troops and Mobutu’s ex-soldiers against pro-US Pascal Lissouba. France had provided the aircrafts to transport Chadian soldiers, and the pro-French networks had purchased weapons for Sassou’s cobras and passed them through Gabon. In September 1998, Chad sent 2000 soldiers in the North-West region of the DRC to strengthen Kabila’s army.

The Sudanese regime also joined the war on the side of pro-French networks, providing training to Kabila's soldiers, weapons, and finally sending 2000 soldiers to the DRC. It also continued supplying coordination, logistics, rear bases and arms to 3 rebel movements at war with Uganda and the SPLA\textsuperscript{31}. France is also helping these guerillas with weapons passed through the Central African Republic.

\textit{The American allies}

As compared to those of France, American allies appear much less powerful and connected. As a relatively recent newcomer, the USA have mainly been involved in the Great Lakes region’s crisis. They have tried to benefit from France’s setbacks in the area, in fueling the war against Habyarimana’s regime, in Rwanda, then that of Kabila against Mobutu’s regime, and finally
the current war against Kabila waged by Uganda, Rwanda and several guerilla movements. US interests are thus represented by Rwandese and Ugandese armies as well as by a coalition of anti-Kabila Zairian movements among which the ex-soldiers of Mobutu are an important force. In Sudan, Uganda supports the war effort of the SPLA (Sudane Peoples Liberation Army) to fight back the sudanese, and pro-French, regime. Burundi and Zambia are also, de facto, operating in the interest of the USA, in fighting its enemies. While Burundi’s government is fighting extremist hutus, Zambia, in spite of its official neutrality in the DRC conflict, is accused of protecting Savimbi’s UNITA, at war against the Angolan government, the latter fighting along side France’s allies. 30 000 UNITA soldiers would be on hide in Zambia’s refugee camps, along the border with the DRC. UNITA is also giving a hand to rebel movements of the Cabinda strip, also at war with Angolan troops.

Of course, like during the Cold War, there are situations in which France as well as the USA can support both sides of a conflict to promote best their interests.

**Counter-Instrumentalisation of the rivalry by Victim-States**

Just like for the previous Cold War, ruling elites of client-states can manage to retain a significant bargain power, playing off the two rivals. As O’Brien puts it, “the notion of an American challenge to the French position in Africa has been encouraged by some African Heads of state, as part of the politics of international clientelism. This notion would appear to represent the trump card of a group of Francophone leaders (Houphouet-Boigny, Bongo, Eyadema, Mobutu) who have manipulated the French press in its African coverage to put pressure on French leaders suspected of weakening in their commitment to the continent or to themselves...” Some African leaders “have managed to control Franco-African relations, dictating a particular policy to Paris, by their constant pressure (...). The bargaining power of these patrimonialisms is formidable, disposing as they do of the totality of the resources of their countries... The African governments use dependency as a carefully maintained resource –it is not enough to say that (they) have a relative autonomy towards France: often they compel her to act.” Indeed, in April 1998, Gabonese dictator Omar Bongo declared that he would penalise French companies in favour of American ones if judges enquiring on the many-sided activities of French oil company Elf would make public defavourable findings, such as those related to the subsidies and bribes paid to his regime and close friends.
Zaire offers a very good example of such counter-instrumentalisation of the rivalry by African client-states. As long ago as in the 1970s, Mobutu gradually shifted from his American allegiance to develop relations with France, which soon became an important if not the main military supplier of the regime. Zaire became a leading participant in the Francophone movement. But Zaire’s riches kept on attracting American interest, and the US government increased its aid in the 1980s, Mobutu playing off the two rivals to encourage France to offer even higher bids, leading to a significant increase of American and French Official Development Aid to Zaire. After the Cold War, when Mobutu’s regime started to collapse, USA and France came to an agreement on a transition to Mobutu. But the dictator managed to get back France’s support in making himself indispensable to the defense of French networks’ interests in the Rwandan crisis, when he organised the provision of weapons to pro-French extremist Hutus. At the 1994 Franco-African Summit, French president Francois Mitterrand publicly re-affirmed France’s support in welcoming the Zairian dictator and having Mobutu seating next to him.

At the same time, rebel leader Kabila used Mobutu’s commitment to French interests to get the support of American (among others) mining companies and the US government. In 1996, the USA thus supported Kabila’s guerilla warfare against Mobutu’s regime, but realised gradually that Mobutu’s opponent was quite unreliable. In early 1997, US officials distanced themselves from Kabila and tried to promote negotiations between the warring sides. They came back to a more frank support to Kabila when he appeared to be in a position to win the war and take power. But the new dictator soon became even more unreliable, turning to France to get rid of his former Rwandan allies, and in the process got rid of American supervision as well.

If some African Heads of states retain some bargaining power due to the American-French rivalry, pro-French networks never hesitated to eliminate (or let eliminate) pro-French dictators becoming too independent, or too greedy. When Congo’s President Pascal Lissouba, in a desperate move to get cash money to pay government’s salaries, and after the refusal of Elf, turned to American Occidental Petroleum (Oxy), offering to mortgage State’s future oil revenues, he proved to be unreliable for pro-French networks. The pro-French networks provided the logistics to overthrow him in 1997.

Multilateralisation of conflict-resolution: the multilateralisation of domination?
As the conflict between the two powers in Africa, and their allies, expands, interventions of any sort become less reliable and more costful. The multilateralisation of conflict-resolution and peace-keeping seems necessary to maintain influence.

**The Blockage of International Organisations**

The UN Security Council is the natural venue for discussions on the resolution of inter-state conflicts. But as a powerful organisation with troops to enforce its decisions, it is the object of French-American rivalry. The two contenders are fighting to impose their candidates for the position of Secretary-General of the institution, often Africans, a sign of the importance of the continent for them. If France managed to impose its candidate, the francophone Egyptian B. Boutros-Ghali, in 1992, it failed to do so in 1997, when the pro-American candidate, and anglophone Ghanaian K. Annan won.

However important the choice of the UN Secretary-General might be, it doesn’t mean much if the UN are prevented from functioning because of the new Cold War, as shown in the Great Lake crisis. The UN Secretary-General received the first alarming reports on the preparation of a genocide in Rwanda long before April 1994, but chose to ignore them. Why, if not because Rwanda was part of the “private hunting ground” of one of the main members of the Security Council, and precisely the country to which the UN S-G was the most attached? When the genocide started, B. Boutros-Ghali, instead of intervening to stop the massacres, sent a special correspondent, J-R Booh-Booh, an ex-Minister of Cameroonean pro-French dictator Paul Biya, and a friend of Habyarimana, to find out what was going on. This “impartial witness” immediately started to spread the news of inter-ethnic massacres, rather than a genocide, and so during several weeks.

When the full magnitude of the tragedy appeared to all, Boutros-Ghali requested the deployment of 5500 UN peacekeeping troops, as suggested initially by France, who was even prepared to send its own soldiers. Such an intervention would have indeed prevented the US-backed RPF to take control of the whole country. It would have forced both sides to negotiate, which means that the Hutu extremists would have had to be part of any transitory government. To allow the necessary reconciliation, the launching of the genocide would have had to be officially “forgotten”, or forgiven. Rwanda wouldn’t have fallen to the “anglosaxons”, the conditions for a future take over of the pro-French elements would have been preserved. For the USA, this proposal couldn’t be accepted. The RPF had to take over from the extremist Hutus. As a result, the
UN were put into a standstill, and France sent its own troops (Operation Turquoise). The USA, once the RPF firmly in power, authorised the deployment of 7500 UN troops to organise humanitarian relief operations.

As the crisis in the Great Lake Region was spreading to Zaire, with the Kabila’s guerilla fighting to overthrow Mobutu’s dictatorship, France again tried to mobilise the UN about the deployment of an international military force in eastern Zaire, officially to bring humanitarian aid and protection to dozens of thousands of hutu refugees. But this humanitarian concern was concealing another objective. This force would have in fact slowed down, if not stopped a war that was threatening seriously Mobutu’s pro-French regime, to put instead a pro-US one. Of course, the USA vetoed the French proposal.

Regional Forces and Mechanisms?
As the UN proved unable to respond to crisis threatening American or French interests on the African continent, and because of the failure, or the political cost of direct military interventions, both rivals developed their own regional initiatives to substitute strictly, but under influence, African levels of decision to international ones.

The first way to influence the resolution of conflicts according to French or American interests was the organisation, on a regular basis, of international summits. France initiated the French-African Summits in 1973 and managed rapidly to attract even more African states than the OAU summits, with as many as 49 African countries attending the 1998 one. France also impulsed and funded La Francophonie, an association of 49 states, among them 29 in Africa, used to serve as a moral guaranty for rigged elections in pro-French countries, or as a tool to organise peace negotiations controlled by France in Africa.

The American answer to French hegemony on intra-continental relations, came in 1991 with the launching of the African/African-American summits, and organised the first three summits in the core of La Francophonie, in Abidjan, Libreville and Dakar. The USA are also investing more and more money in the Organisation of the African Unity, in an attempt to restore its role in African conflicts and undermine thus that of the French-African summits.

An other way to keep up with the extend of current conflicts is the development of regional mechanisms to mobilise African-only peacekeeping forces on the continent. Support for the creation of such forces provides a convenient excuse for further military support. In the early 1990s, the
USA started to talk about “an African capacity to deal with conflicts in their formative stage”, and finally came up with the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), which mandates the training and equipping of military units in several African countries, to be deployed in peacemaking and peacekeeping operations. The ACRI and an other US-sponsored military training programmes have already been provided to military personels in 34 African countries, including 6 of the 7 countries with troops involved in the Congolese war and both Eritrea and Ethiopia.

France has also encouraged its allies to develop a regional capacity for peacemaking and peacekeeping. After the 1994 French-African summit, negotiations started among pro-French west African countries. The RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) programme was born few years later, and organised its first training sessions in February 1998, in Senegal, with French logistics, and troops from Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Vert, Ghana and Gambia, and a symbolic contribution from the USA and the UK. Equipments and weapons are kept at the French military base in Dakar, a clear sign that there won’t be any intervention of the RECAMP forces without France’s approval.37

A similar force also developed within the framework of the anglophone Economic Community of West African States. When the war broke out in Liberia, Nigeria mobilised ECOWAS members to send troops to restore Doe’s friendly government. Francophone states tried to prevent the creation of the force, in vain. On the contrary, the USA funded the initiative, which they were perceiving as hostile to pro-French interests. To try to make it appear neutral, they offered money to Senegal to join, but Senegal soon withdrew.

In 1991 however, francophone states changed their mind and joined Ecomog, in an obvious attempt to stop it or secure their interests, while still supporting Charles Taylor’s war. If the ECOMOG forces proved unable to stop the war, a new mechanism had been created, which pro-French networks even managed to use. When a revolt broke out in pro-French Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Guinea-Conackry intervened, to restore President Viera’s pro-French regime, but were soon replaced by an Ecomog force shipped to the country by France in January 1999. The leader of the rebellion had declared that he had “fought and (would) continue fighting the involvement of France and Senegal in this conflict”.38

Conclusion
Just like for the previous Cold War, poverty and famines, racial hatred and violences, and even genocides are provoked by the two powers’ confrontation. A major cause of Africa’s tragic situation, the new Cold War between the USA and France is to intensify in the coming decade, with the USA investing more and more to challenge French supremacy and interests in the continent. 

Notes and References

1 Dept of Politics, Rhodes University, (xrenou2@wanadoo.fr)
4 The Franc Zone includes 20 countries, all francophone but Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea.
5 Public procurements are essential to French companies such as Bouygues, V. Bolloré’s, Alcatel-Alsthom, Dassault (armaments), Airbus, who retain monopolistic situations on the provision of telecommunications, electricity and major infrastructures to Africa.
6 Only 4% of the billions of French Francs given to African countries each year (40 billion in 1993, 18 billion in 1998) was spent on developmental projects. The rest is aimed at strengthening administrations, public or specific private companies (such as banks) facing bankruptcy, equipping and training armies, or tied up to the purchase of French products or the granting of public procurements. Some of it is used to bribe officials and businessmen of both sides. Indeed, about 25% of the ODA is diverted by ways of over invoicing, bribes, public procurement paid but never-delivered, and illegal activities. Highly profitable speculation on debts of Francophone African countries is also facilitated by the ODA. See François-Xavier Vershive, La Françafrique, le plus long scandale de la République, Stock, Paris, 1998.
7 Drug trafficking is clearly taking place in, and involve the governments of Morocco, Chad, Rwanda, Sudan, Djibouti, the Republic of Congo, Mauritania, as well as in the south of Western Africa, with drugs being smuggled in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Casamance, Guinea-Bissau for the benefit of the pro-French networks.
8 Recently, weapons were sold to the Extremist hutus in 1994, through Zaire, then to Zaire itself, for the defense of Mobutu’s pro-French regime, in 1996 and 1997, through Libya and Chad. Comoros islands were used to transit weapons to be sold to Chechen guerilla fighters, at war with Russia. Prostitutes provided to African heads of State or high-ranking figures by pro-French intermediaries prove not only profitable, but also a means for blackmail.
10 Blaise Compaoré married an adoptive daughter of Houphouet Boigny, who was the widow of the son of former Liberian President W. Tolbert. Denis Sassou Nguesso is the father-in-law of Omar Bongo.
11 Agir Ici/Survie, Sommet Franco-Africain au Louvre : la Sécurité au Sommet, l’insécurité a la base, Dossiers noirs de la Politique Africaine de la France n°12, L’Harmattan 1998, p.142. For example, Rwandese dictator’s widow and her accomplices in the genocide, such as Colonel Bagosora and the leader of the Interahamwe militias were smuggled out of Rwanda by French agents of the secrets services. Habyarimana’s widow even received some money from President F. Mitterrand on her arrival in Paris.
12 As P. Hugon puts it, “the pre-eminent role of the institutions of Washington (encouraged by the new French African policy) is the more explicable as France is the most exposed country to African
indebtedness, at the level of its banking system and its public institutions, and as the French treasury... is concerned that the conditionalities should be those of the IMF and the World Bank”, in Donald B. Cruise O’Brien, op.cit.

14 7 more should be opened soon. in Charlie-Hebdo 28.07.1999.
15 The damages caused to industrialized countries’ economies by the OPEC decisions to raise oil prices could easily happen again should major producers of raw materials such as the African ones unite and impose new prices. The fear of the emergence of an oil giant able to stabilize supply and dictate increased prices played a major role in US decision to go to war with Iraq in 1990-91.
16 John S. Saul and Colin Leys, op.cit.
20 Revisionist perspective, business-conflict approach, analysis on military-industrial complexes in the USA and the USSR, all focusing on the role played by big business and major economic interests in the pursuit of the Cold War.
24 By 1994, the USA were running 3 military bases in Egypt, 1 in Morocco, 2 in Somalia, 3 in Kenya and one in the Indian Ocean, close to the continent, in Diego Garcia. They had signed military agreements with Egypt, Morocco, Liberia, Somalia, Kenya and Zaire.
27 In spite of a massive fraud, Eyadema lost the 1998 elections and had to mobilize his army to stay in office and crush the opposition.
28 Under S. Abacha, Nigeria joined the Francophonie and granted economic concessions to French TNCs such as Total.
30 Sierra Leone, anglophone, was interesting in terms of diamond smuggling, and was offering a logistic base for ECOMOG troops, considered as hostile to French interests.
31 Lord’s Resistance Army, Allied Democratic Forces and West-Nile Bank Front
32 Angola would have attempted to overthrow Zambia’s government to end up its support to UNITA.
33 France and Gabon would help rebels of the oil-rich Cabinda region, whose leader was in exile in France. Pro-French networks also supported both sides in Congo’s civil war, while Burkina Faso would support UNITA rebels. In Zaire in 1997, the USA brought support to both Mobutu and Kabila. They sold weapons to both Eritrea and Ethiopia.
34 Donald B. Cruise O’Brien, op.cit.
36 Michel Sitbon, op.cit. p.73.
37 When troubles broke out in the Central African Republic, French troops were soon replaced by an African peace-keeping force sent by 6 (mostly pro-French) African States. Chad alone provided 50%
of the MISAB forces, in June 1997, with French logistics. Massacres of civilians were perpetrated by MISAB forces.

38 Continental n°8, Feb-March 1999. A Peace accord was signed in November 1998, but an other military coup finally ousted President Viera in May 1999. Elections were organized in December 1999.

39 To be complete, a study of the new Cold War should analyse the role of other important actors, such as the Western TNCs, Japan or the European Union, and Great Britain in particular, or the two African giants, South Africa and Nigeria.